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ABSTRACT 
Since Schumpeter, a major concern has been: what monopoly does to growth? Monopoly’s 
static, allocative inefficiency is well established. How much this is offset by its dynamic 
progressiveness is unclear. First, using the empirical literature, we argue that the presumed 
progressiveness of monopoly must be rejected. Second, we extend the endogenous growth model 
to obtain a full Pareto ranking of competition, monopoly, Cournot and Bertrand. Competition 
beats Cournot, which in turn beats monopoly. Growth rate is invariant with structures, which 
accords well with empirical evidence. Bertrand happens to share the ranking with competition. 
The findings have a strong anti-trust overtone. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At least since Schumpeter (1942), a major concern in economics has been whether a case 
can be built for monopoly’s dynamic efficiency. The verdict, as far as Schumpeter is concerned, 
is clearly in favor of monopoly and against competition. In his famous chapter on “The Process 
of Creative Destruction,” he writes enthusiastically about the virtue and the progress of 
capitalism, about how spectacular improvements in our society are achieved and that “… big 
business may have had more to do with creating that standard of life than with keeping it down” 
(p.82). At the same time, and with no less fervor, he laments competition as “A system – any 
system, economic or other – that at every point of time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best 
advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a system that does so at no given point of time, 
because the latter’s failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of long-run 
performance” (p.83, italics added).  
There have been countless empirical and theoretical papers to evaluate this ‘Schumpeter 
hypothesis’, or, shall we call it, the Schumpeterian controversy.  In the first place, what is meant 
by this hypothesis is never clear. A careful rereading of the above passages conveys a distinction 
between the static virtues of competition and the dynamic progressiveness of monopoly. So, 
monopoly power is supposed to have a positive impact on how the society progresses “in the 
long run”. In modern parlance Schumpeter would perhaps have said that if a society’s productive 
activity is organized under larger businesses and with greater market power, then this society 
will exhibit a faster long-term rate of economic growth; in addition, the benefit that this bestows 
to the society is more important than the static allocative efficiency of competition. 
At least since Solow (1956), there is a clear distinction between the level effect and the rate 
of growth effect in economic development. It is now well known, thanks to the wave of 
endogenous growth models led by Arrow (1962), Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Grossman 
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and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), that external effects in learning, R&D, 
physical and/or human capital accumulation can generate, and alter, long-term growth rates. Two 
inferences are therefore immediate. First, the progressiveness of monopoly capitalism in the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis must be at least primarily, if not predominantly, about the rate of 
growth effect instead of the level effect. Second, amongst the host of factors we have just 
mentioned, R&D comes closest to Schumpeter’s description of how monopoly is linked to 
growth. R&D expenditure of major industrial countries has, indeed, risen consistently and 
significantly over the past century.  
The real issue, however, is not really whether monopoly is more innovative, or if it yields 
faster growth. This question is important, and we will examine it carefully Section 2. What really 
matters, even if monopoly is dynamically more progressive, is whether this outweighs the static, 
level inefficiency effect of monopoly. All monopoly, unregulated, will produce an output level 
that is less than socially optimal. This static inefficiency, called the triangular deadweight loss, 
has not been incorporated into the growth literature. When this is done, and when the 
monopoly’s rate of growth effect is also established, then we may hope to arrive at a conclusion 
on the Schumpeterian hypothesis. This, in short, is the purpose of the present paper. 
More specifically, my plan is as follows. In Section 2 I will discuss the rate of growth effect 
of market power. A clear picture emerges by examining several interesting findings that have 
become available in the recent literature. Sections 3 and 4 then study the level effect of various 
market structures. I will seek to rank competition, monopoly, Cournot and Bertrand by their 
relative position to the Pareto optimum. This, for the first time, links endogenous growth to the 
full spectrum of market structure. Section 5 combines the rate of growth and the level effects, 
and concludes the essay. 
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2. MARKET CONCENTRATION AND THE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Does market power promote faster long-term growth? In this section I will address this 
question by, first of all, examining the existing empirical evidence in the literature. The next 
question is how to reconcile and understand what we observe empirically with recent 
developments in theoretical models of endogenous growth. 
The most direct way to find out if concentration promotes growth is to ask whether market 
structure has changed in recent decades and whether that has caused persistent changes in growth 
rate. This is similar to the approach adopted by Jones (1995a), in which he tests the endogenous 
growth models. Jones finds that OECD countries in the 20th century significantly increased their 
R&D activities. Growth rates, however, have remained remarkably constant. Since it is most 
unlikely that other factors have exactly offsetting effects to preserve constant growth, Jones 
concludes that R&D has no persistent effect on long-term growth.  
So growth rates in OECD countries have been largely constant in the 20th century. Market 
structure must not have changed violently if it affects growth; or else exactly offsetting 
movements in other factors are again required. There is widespread agreement that market 
structure has been on the rise for much of the 20th century.2 A representative study is Prais 
(1976), which reports that in the U.K., the 100-firm concentration ratio increased by 156 percent 
from 16 in 1909 to 41 in 1970; and in the U.S., it increased by 50 percent from 22 to 33 over the 
same period. In addition, the increase in concentration has been gradual and persistent, a manner 
that would elicit changes in growth rates. Admittedly, opinion on this has not been unanimous, 
                                                          
2 Movement in market concentration is an old topic and the most comprehensive survey I know 
of is Curry and George (1983, pp.227-9). The extensive evidence cited in their survey was 
clearly in support of rising market concentration in the 20 century. 
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but the great majority of papers in the literature are generally in support of Prais. Among the 
dissenting voices, an important one is Shepherd (1982). He begins by reporting, in agreement 
with Prais, that there was a substantial rise in market concentration in U.S. manufacturing from 
1909 to 1970. But when he studies the aggregate economy, he finds that competition increased 
from 1939 to 1980. He attributes the rise in competition to imports, anti-trust, and deregulation. 
However, even if concentration has retreated temporarily during the post-WWII decades, there is 
strong recent evidence that market power is again on the rise since 1980. According to Pryor 
(2001), throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, market concentration has been rising across the 
United States. Pryor believes that the merger waves in these decades have increased monopoly 
power significantly. 
The general picture is that market concentration has risen for most of the 20th century, 
perhaps with momentary resurgence of competition. Indeed the rise in concentration may help to 
explain the significant rise in R&D activities reported by Jones. The conclusive evidence, again, 
is that OECD growth rates have remained remarkably constant. In major industrial countries the 
rise in market concentration has failed to change long-term growth rate. The presumed 
progressiveness of monopoly capitalism has not passed the empirical test as far as the long-term 
rate of growth is concerned. 
So why has market structure failed to connect to growth? As mentioned earlier, R&D is the 
most eligible candidate worthy of investigation. As Jones (1995a) has shown, R&D indeed rose 
significantly during the past decades. It is not important whether the intensity of R&D was raised 
by the observed rise in concentration. Even if it was, the crucial question is why the increase in 
R&D has failed to raise the long-term rate of income growth.  
The possible influence of R&D on long-term growth has currently been subject to a great 
deal of discussion in the literature. Debates have centered on the specification of how the 
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residual technology in production evolves over time, and, in particular, on whether the level of 
technology increases or decreases speed of technological change. The question is, in other words, 
whether there are decreasing returns to R&D activity. The literature has been aptly summarized 
by Jones (1999), and there is no need to describe it here.  
To illustrate the point, we may take a closer look at a recent response to the absence of a 
scale effect that has not been discussed in Jones (1999). Peretto and Smulders (2002) suggest that 
as society’s technology level increases, so does the distance of each firm’s technology to that of 
the society. The externally, or socially, shared technology becomes more and more remote, and 
less and less applicable to one’s own. This ‘knowledge dilution’ as Peretto and Smulders call it, 
is in effect a negative spillover rising with the size of the economy. It counteracts the original 
positive knowledge spillover, and asymptotically eliminates endogenous growth. The conclusion, 
shared in varying degree by Jones (1995b), Smulders and Klundert (1995), Peretto (1996, 1999), 
and Young (1998), has the effect of revitalizing the classic growth conclusion of Solow (1956), 
where growth rate depends on population growth, but not on the saving rate or government 
policies.  
Like the saving rate, monopoly power may only have transient level effects on the economy, 
and not have any effects on the rate of long-term growth. The intuition that emerges from the 
literature is that monopoly is not so much a less efficient researcher than competition, but rather 
that there could be strong diminishing returns in research. It could also be that monopoly does 
more research that generates different varieties of products, or creates different ways of doing the 
same thing, compared to competition. The society may become more varied, and consumer 
choices may increase under monopoly. A greater assortment of choices could enhance welfare. 
Comparing welfare gain from a richer choice set with that from the traditional measure of greater 
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quantity is an important but difficult issue that will not be addressed here. It could be a rewarding 
direction for future research. 
Still, the empirical fact remains that growth rate has not changed, despite the shifts in market 
concentration. Returning to the Schumpeterian hypothesis, we have no choice, so long as we 
adhere to the view that more progress equates to faster growth of per capita output, but to largely 
discount the progressiveness of monopoly power. What is left is its level effect. This is the 
subject that I will examine in details in the next section. 
 
3. EXTERNALITIES, MARKET STRUCTURE AND GROWTH 
Recent papers by Smulders and Klundert (1995), Peretto (1996, 1999), and Duranton (2000) 
have begun to extend main-stream endogenous growth models of Romer (1986, 1990), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) beyond the market structure of 
monopolistic competition. For the most part, the new models have focused on endogenous 
market structure, which is determined by sunken R&D. The complexity of endogeneity, however, 
has limited the scope of structures examined. It has not been shown, for instance, how monopoly 
compares to competition, and how monopoly and competition compare to various types of 
oligopoly as an economy grows. To obtain sharp comparisons, I will assume exogenous market 
structure in what follows. This is a strong assumption, but the reward is a full set of Pareto 
ranking of all the major market structures. In addition, in this model growth rate turns out to be 
invariant to market structures, which is consistent to the empirical finding of Jones (1995a) noted 
in the last section. 
I will adopt a type of endogenous growth described by Romer (1986). In this model, 
externalities are generated by individual firms’ production activity. It is external to the firm, 
since each one is too small to realize its contribution to the aggregate knowledge stock. An 
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infinitely large number of firms operating side-by-side, however, determine the aggregate 
knowledge stock and total productivity. This way of reconciling competition with aggregate 
increasing returns can be traced to at least Marshall (1920). A more familiar textbook application 
of this idea is that each competitive firm takes price as given, yet it is the aggregate output 
decision that determines the market price. Romer (1986) gives a careful interpretation of this 
externality, which drives growth. 
One way to describe this economy is that its whole is greater than the sum of its parts. First, 
we have to choose a production function that conveniently preserves competition at the firm 
level, yet allows increasing returns in the economy. Imagine an economy with one consumption 
good, denoted y, which is produced by capital k and labor l. Externalities are generated by the 
use of capital in production. This is much simpler than learning-by-doing in the sense of Arrow 
(1962). Each firm indeed learns and generates knowledge, but, first, this knowledge contributes 
only to the common efficiency of industry production, and cannot be retained as proprietary to 
the firm. Second, this effect is so insignificant to the firm that it is ignored in its profit 
calculations. However, the industry is immense compared to each individual firm. The sum total 
of individual firms’ contribution is indeed significant, and it propels productivity development 
and growth.  
A brief comment should be made about the number of firms. In competitive price 
determination, the number of firms plays no significant role at all and is thus arbitrary. For 
similar reasons this number has no significance to the argument of externalities. It simplifies the 
model and we lose no generality by keeping the number of firms implicit and in the background. 
Romer (1986) adopted the same modeling strategy. It is the aggregate quantity that counts, not 
the number of firms that produce the quantity. Moreover, since much of the analysis can be 
conducted in a static setting, all time references are therefore suppressed.  
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Let the production function satisfy 
(1) . 1 , 0 1; 0y K k lβ α α α β−= < < >
K is external effect, and the Hicks-neutral total productivity is K β . At the firm’s level, 
production is Cobb-Douglas since each treats K β  as a constant. At the industry level, however, 
K is aggregate capital arising from, and equal to, the economy’s aggregate usage of k. There is 
externality since 0β > , and the extent of externality increases with both β  and K.  
 In this section I will present the analysis in the order of competition (which is the same as 
Romer’s result in his 1986 paper), then monopoly, then the social planner, then the monopoly 
again but this time with the externalities internalized. It is convenient to start with Romer, since 
that links my paper directly to the literature on growth.  
 
3.1.  EXTERNALITY AND COMPETITION (ROMER) 
 Since all y-producers face the Cobb-Douglas function (1), the industry will be competitive 
and price-taking. Assigning y the role of the numeraire, and denoting the demand price for k by 
, the aggregate demand for capital is ( )r k
(2) 1 1 1 1( )r k K k l k lβ α α α βα α α− − + −= = − . 
As shown by the second equality, the equilibrium process internalizes the externality. The 
atomistic y-firms in aggregate hire some amount of capital k, each failing to notice that their 
action in total generates an external effect K k= . That allows me to express the demand price 
for capital as 1 1k lα βα + − −α  in (2). To ensure the negative slope of the demand curve, I shall assume 
1β α< − , that is, that externality is ‘not too strong’. If this assumption fails to hold, in other 
words if externality is too large, equilibrium in the capital-good industry may not exist. In that 
case, a steady state growth path also fails to exist. This claim will be verified shortly. 
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Following Romer (1986), suppose the capital-good industry is also competitive. For 
simplicity, one unit of y (the numeraire) is convertible into one unit of k. Here we can see that the 
problem has no dynamics since savings and investment are fully independent in this economy. 
Equilibrium requires the demand for capital to be equal to the horizontal supply curve of capital, 
which implies 
(3) 1 1 1k lα β αα + − − = . 
 Equation (3) must hold in the long-term steady state, and from this the aggregate growth rate 
of capital is easily derived. Assuming a constant exogenous rate of population (labor) growth, 
µ , the constant growth rate of capital is 
(4) 1
1
kg
k
α µα β
−≡ = ⋅− −

. 
Next, the per capita growth rate of k is simply g µ− , which is obtained from (4) 
(5) 
1
g βµ µα β− = ⋅− − . 
 The rationale for our assumption 1β α< −   is now apparent. 1β α> −  would have implied 
negative growth. Clearly the growth rate of capital, both aggregate and per capita, increases with 
β . This, of course, was the thesis of Romer. In fact, if we allow β  to rise and to approach 1 α− , 
growth rate increases without bound.  
In what follows, equation (3) and it counter parts, to be developed below, suffice for a 
complete Pareto ranking of all the market structures. In this simple economy, aggregate as well 
as per capita consumption clearly depend on k. For that reason, consumption growth rate depends 
on the rate of growth of k. For the sake of comparing between market structures, I do not even 
have to specify consumption and utility explicitly. Since the marginal cost of capital is 1, 
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everything in this system is generated by the marginal revenue of capital, which, of course, 
reflects the market structure of the capital industry. I now turn to the structure of monopoly.  
 
3.2.  EXTERNALITIES AND MONOPOLY 
The production function of the final consumption good again satisfies (1), and because of 
externalities the demand for k satisfies (2). 
Suppose capital is supplied by a monopoly. Unlike the competitive industry in subsection 
(3.1), in which each firm takes r k  as given, the monopolist chooses k to maximize profits ( )
(6) . 1( ) ( ) ( )k r k k k k lα β αφ α + −Π = − = − k
1
In the second equality in (6) we have used (2), and the previous assumption of constant unit 
production cost of k. 
 Maximizing (6) using (2) gives 
(7) 1 1( )k lα β αα α β + − −+ = . 
It is routine to check the growth rate of capital g is again given by (4) along the steady state 
growth path, and that the growth rate of per capita capital is given by (5). Both competition and 
monopoly will have the same growth rate. As mentioned earlier, one of our results is that market 
structure does not change long-term growth rate. This will hold for all the structures examined 
below. The monopoly will supply a different (smaller, see below) quantity of k than competition, 
but as it does so in every period, and always to the same extent, thus its growth rate of k is 
exactly the same as that under competition. 
 To obtain these different levels of k along the two growth paths, we simply compare (3) and 
(7). Clearly the equilibrium level of y produced under monopoly must be smaller under (7) than 
under (3). More precisely, monopoly’s output level must be ( 1α β )+ <  times that of 
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competition’s, and the proportional difference, as noted earlier, is the same always as the 
economy grows.  
The reason for the lower output level under monopoly is simple. Restricting output to 
increase profits is what monopolies do. The immediate question is: How far is that from optimal? 
The benchmark Pareto position, because of externalities, is not competition as established in 
subsection (3.1). Romer (1986), of course, noted that. The justification for social planning, in 
Romer’s case, comes from the externalities depicted in (2). We have, in addition, another 
justification owing to non-competitive market structures. 
To establish the benchmark for welfare rankings, I now turn to the social planner’s problem.  
 
3.3.  INTERNALIZED EXTERNALITIES AND COMPETITION (SOCIAL 
PLANNER) 
 The sources of inefficiencies in my system are externalities and monopoly. Internalizing the 
externalities, for instance by means of a system of lump-sum taxes and subsidies, and 
maintaining competition, could correct both inefficiencies and achieve the social optimum.  
When externalities are internalized, the production function becomes 1y k lα β α+ −= , and the 
demand for k is  
(8)          r k 1 1( ) ( )k lα β αα β + − −= + .  
Under competitive supply of k, its rental price should be equal to the marginal cost, thus 
(9) . 1 1( )k lα β αα β + − −+ =1
Not surprisingly, the growth rates are the same as under competition (3.1) and monopoly 
(3.2), but the level of the variables is again different. Comparing (9) and (3), the competitive 
output level in (3.1) is less than socially optimal. That difference, as noted earlier, arises purely 
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from the externalities in the production function (1). It follows that the second inefficiency of the 
system, in which the output level of monopoly (3.2) falls short of competition’s (3.1), arises 
purely from the social loss due to monopoly’s restriction of output. The monopoly chooses its 
output by equating marginal cost to marginal revenue, which is lower than price. 
 
3.4.  INTERNALIZED EXTERNALITIES AND MONOPOLY 
 Since we have two structures, competition and monopoly, and two scenarios, externalities 
and internalization, there are altogether four cases to consider. Three of them have been 
examined above. To complete the picture we now turn to the remaining case of internalized 
externalities and monopoly. 
Suppose we have a system, as mentioned in (3.3) above consisting of lump-sum taxes and 
subsidies, by which the externalities are internalized. However, the supply of k remains 
monopolized. When each y-firm internalizes the externality, the demand for k again satisfies (8). 
Using this, and the constant marginal cost of k, the monopoly’s profits is 
 . 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k r k k k k lα β αφ α β + −Π = − = + − k
1
Now the equilibrium, when the monopoly equates marginal cost to marginal revenue, 
implies 
(10) . 2 1 1( ) k lα β αα β + − −+ =
 The growth rates are again the same as in the three cases before, but the levels of the 
variables differ. Under monopoly in (3.4), the level of output of y is again less than socially 
optimal, but it is larger than that under (3.2) because now externalities are no longer a problem.  
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To summarize, the welfare rankings of the four cases studied thus far depend on the 
following parameters: 
3.1: α     [Externalities and competition (Romer)] 
3.2: ( )α α β+   [Externalities and monopoly] 
3.3: ( )α β+    [Internalized externalities and competition (social planner)] 
3.4: ( )( )α β α β+ +  [Internalized externalities and monopoly] 
 
 Recall our equilibrium condition 0 1α β< + < , and 0β >  for a positive externality. The 
overall dominance of Pareto is immediate from 3.3>3.1, 3.3>3.2, and 3.3>3.4. Since marginal 
cost is 1, marginal revenue is below the optimal value of the social planner in all the cases. We 
can see that competition beats monopoly on two counts. First, when there are externalities 
(3.1>3.2); and second, when externalities are internalized (3.3>3.4). Clearly, 3.2 is the worst of 
all states. Beginning from 3.2, as competition improves welfare since 3.1>3.2, so does 
internalizing externalities improve welfare since 3.4>3.2. Finally it is easy to check that 3.1>3.4 
if and only if  
 β α α< − . 
This says, somewhat trivially, that competition is more important than internalizing externalities, 
or, that monopoly is more damaging than externalities provided that externalities are sufficiently 
small. 
 
4.  EXTERNALITIES AND OLIGOPOLY 
It should be clear from the last section that internalizing externalities improves welfare 
under any given market structure. For that reason I shall leave the internalizing of externalities 
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aside in this section, and focus my investigation on market structures alone.  An obvious 
direction to proceed is in that of oligopoly, and for that I shall examine Cournot and Bertrand. 
Not surprisingly, both of these structures are Pareto-preferred to monopoly, and both are, in their 
corresponding degrees, inferior to the social optimum. 
 
4.1.  COURNOT OLIGOPOLY 
 Suppose production of the consumption good, y, still satisfies (1), and hence the market 
demand for capital satisfies (2). There are externalities.  
Suppose this aggregate demand curve for y is shared by a pair of symmetric Cournot 
duopolies. The assumption of symmetry is for simplicity and should not affect the main results 
that follow. I can write the oligopoly supplies explicitly using firm subscripts, i.e. 
(11) ( ) 1 11 2 1 2( )r k k k k lα β αα + − −+ = + . 
Firm 1, which assumes  constant, chooses  to maximize profits, which can be written as 2k 1k
(12) . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1, ,k k r k k k k k k l k kα β αφ α + − −Π = − = + 1−
2
The first order condition is  
(13) . ( )( ) ( )2 11 11 2 1 1 21 1k k l k k k lα β α βα αα α β α+ − + −− −+ − + + + =
Because of symmetry, (13) applies for both firms. We are interested in total Cournot industry 
output, which is simply . Using this and 1k k k= + 1 2kk =  in (13), we get 
 ( ) 2 1 1 11 1
2
kk l k lα β α α β αα α β α+ − − + − −+ − ⋅ + = , 
or, 
(14) 1 11 1
2
k lα β αα βα + − −+ +⋅ ⋅ = . 
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 Not surprisingly, the steady state growth rates are identical to those in Section 3, and more 
specifically to those given by (4) and (5). Since 
 ( )1
2
α βα α α α β+ +> ⋅ > + , 
we know 3.1>4.1>3.2. Cournot Pareto-dominates monopoly, but is dominated by competition. 
This is exactly what we would expect, since total Cournot output is less than the competitive 
level, but Cournot competition raises it above the monopoly level. Needless to say, the social 
planner beats Cournot (3.3>4.1). 
The ranking between (3.4) – internalized monopoly [ ]( )( )α β α β+ + , and (4.1) – Cournot 
with externalities 1
2
α βα + +⋅ 
  , is ambiguous. When there are no externalities, 0β =  then 
4.1>3.4, so Cournot beats monopoly. Ceteris paribus, Cournot’s output is higher than 
monopoly’s, and that is all there is to it when there is no externalities. It is easily checked, 
however, that 2 ( 1)( )
2
α α βα β β+ + + − >  0
d . Thus, for values of d
(8 3)
4
α α αβ > + − , 
2 (( )
2
1)α α βα β + ++ >  and 3.4>4.1 so monopoly beats Cournot. 3  When internalization is 
important, when there are a lot of externalities to be internalized, then we prefer a monopoly with 
externalities which are internalized, to a Cournot with externalities which are not internalized.  
 
4.2.  BERTRAND OLIGOPOLY 
 Production of the final consumption good satisfies (1), and the market demand for capital 
satisfies (2). Again, there are externalities. 
                                                          
3 If 0.5α = , 0.14β >  will satisfy this inequality. 
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Suppose the economy’s capital is supplied by a pair of symmetric Bertrand duopolies. Under 
this structure, Bertrand profit can be written as 
 . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 11 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1, ,k k r k k k k k k l k kα β αφ α + − −Π = − = + 1−
2
Now Bertrand price competition reduces profit to zero. By equating the right-hand side to zero, 
since aggregate capital is , we have 1k k k= +
(15) 1 1 1k lα β αα + − − = . 
The economy’s growth rates are, again, unchanged as before. But clearly (15) is identical to 
(3), hence 4.2=3.1, and Bertrand’s Pareto ranking is identical to Romer’s competition. Since 
marginal cost of k is constant, the competitive supply curve is also constant, and the number of 
firms under competition is immaterial. As long as profit is driven down to zero, having two 
Bertrand firms is just as good as having any number of competitive firms. This result may have 
interesting implications to the policy of breaking up a monopoly. If marginal cost is constant, 
and there is no fixed cost (or fixed cost reasonably small), then breaking up a monopoly into two 
Bertrand firms is as good as perfection competition.4 
Since 4.2=3.1, the position of Bertrand relative to other market structures can be inferred 
directly from that of 3.1, which was discussed in detail at the end of Section 3. In particular, 
Bertrand beats monopoly but is, of course, inferior to the Pareto optimum 3.3. 
                                                          
4  I admittedly have in mind the monopoly power of Microsoft. The condition of constant 
marginal cost is easier to justify than zero fixed cost. If there is a large fixed cost, the case is 
similar to a natural monopoly, and perfect competition cannot be sustained. The Bertrand firms 
will compete until each makes zero profits, and produce a positive output that is as large as can 
be sustained. 
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Two main arguments are presented in this paper. In Section 2, we utilize existing findings in 
the literature to show that the presumption of progressive monopoly capitalism cannot be 
accepted. Long-term growth rates in OECD countries such as the U.S. and U.K. were, by and 
large, constant for much of the 20th century, despite the fact that market concentration rose 
steadily, and R&D activities grew significantly. No matter how we may try to rationalize this, the 
conclusion remains that neither monopoly nor R&D moves the long-term rate of growth. As long 
as we adopt GDP growth rate as the benchmark for progress, a crucial part of the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis, that large businesses and monopoly are needed for progress, must be rejected by 
empirical evidence. 
That leaves us to study, in Sections 3 and 4, the Pareto rankings of monopoly and other 
market structures in long-term growth. Since R&D does not matter, I am free to choose other, 
less specific externalities to generate the positive growth path. I find, given the Romer (1986) 
type of externalities, competition beats Cournot, which in turn beats monopoly. Since there is no 
additional progress to offset monopoly’s allocative inefficiency along the growth path, the case is 
unambiguously in favor of competition and against monopoly. 
Interestingly, Bertrand has exactly the same Pareto ranking as competition. However, this 
result assumes no fixed cost and constant marginal cost. Under these assumptions, both the 
firm’s as well as the aggregate supply curve are horizontal. Firms compete in price until profit is 
entirely dissipated, so total output k must be the same under competition and Bertrand. This 
suggests, again with no fixed cost and constant marginal cost, breaking up a monopoly into a pair 
of Bertrand duopoly is as good as creating a perfectly competitive environment. Admittedly the 
cost assumptions are extreme, but at least we may hope to use them as benchmarks for policy 
evaluations. 
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In Section 2, we cite empirical studies to show that changes in market structure have not 
moved the permanent rate of growth. It is interesting and comforting to find, from the simple 
model with externality of Sections 3 and 4, that growth rate remains unchanged as we move from 
one market structure to another. The reason is simple. Monopoly, for example, restricts output 
but it does so to exactly the same extent at every point in time. Other market structures produce 
different output levels, but the proportional difference is unchanged also at every point in time. 
Hence market structure has a purely level effect, that is, no rate of growth effect. This accords 
well with empirical observations discussed in Section 2. The level effect, a main contribution of 
this paper, has not been noted before in the theoretical growth literature, and neither has it been 
documented empirically. This might be a worthwhile direction for future empirical research. 
To conclude, the dynamic progressiveness of monopoly has failed to find any support, and 
the case against the monopoly’s static allocative inefficiency is straightforwardly carried over to 
the endogenous growth setting. 
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